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I. INTRODUCTION

T

ELEVISION is the lifeblood of the National Football League
(NFL), generating billions of dollars in annual revenue and ensuring the league remains America’s most watched sport. The
league’s television deals also play a major role in promoting on-field parity between the teams; half of the revenue gained from the sale of broadcasting rights is distributed equally among the league’s thirty-two teams.1
In the absence of the NFL’s pooled broadcasting agreements, teams
would individually negotiate their broadcasting deals, which could significantly impact small-market teams and, ultimately, the NFL itself. A recent case out of the Ninth Circuit has made this a possibility by opening
the door to an antitrust challenge against the NFL and DirecTV’s Sunday
Ticket package.2 On appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a claim,
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2021; B.S., Economics, Texas A&M
University, 2018. Special thanks to my family, friends, and the Kansas City Chiefs.
1. Darren Rovell, NFL Teams Share $8.78 Billion in Revenue, ACTION NETWORK
(July 13, 2019, 10:00 PM), https://www.actionnetwork.com/nfl/nfl-2018-19-revenue [https://
perma.cc/4BBL-3WLX].
2. See Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig. v. DirecTV, LLC, 933
F.3d 1136, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 2019).
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the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision, holding that the plaintiffs had
adequately alleged causes of action under both §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.3
Since 1961, the NFL has been exempt from antitrust liability for “sponsored telecasting” under the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (SBA), allowing the teams to collectively sell their rights through a joint agreement
for sponsored telecasts.4 However, a number of courts have held that this
exemption does not apply to telecasts for which subscribers are charged a
fee, which includes DirecTV’s Sunday Ticket.5 Rather than disputing judicial interpretations of the SBA, this casenote will argue that Congress
should consider simply amending the SBA to provide an antitrust exemption for subscription-based telecasts in order to maintain the NFL’s competitive parity. This casenote will use the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision
as a springboard for the discussion.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. THE NFL’S BROADCASTING AGREEMENTS
Three agreements govern the NFL’s broadcasting system: (1) the NFLNetwork Agreement for local broadcasts; (2) the NFL-DirecTV Agreement for out-of-market broadcasts; and (3) the Teams-NFL Agreement,
which pools the teams’ broadcasting rights and gives the NFL exclusive
authority to exercise those rights.6 The NFL-Network Agreement permits
CBS and Fox to broadcast a limited number of local games over cable
television.7 With the exception of a few nationally televised games, most
games are only available on cable within the respective teams’ geographic
area.8 Under the NFL-DirecTV Agreement, DirecTV obtains all of
CBS’s and Fox’s live telecasts and delivers them in a bundled package to
its Sunday Ticket subscribers.9 In order to watch every game, a consumer
must both subscribe to DirecTV and purchase the Sunday Ticket package—an annual cost of over $250.10
B. THE NFL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
The NFL’s history of antitrust litigation regarding its broadcasting
practices began in 1953 with United States v. National Football League
(NFL I),11 in which the court enjoined the league from restricting the sale
of telecasts. After NFL I, teams competed against each other both on the
3. Id. at 1144.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1961).
5. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dall. Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 301 (3d Cir.
1999); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 671 (7th Cir.
1992).
6. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1148.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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field and in the market for broadcasting rights.12 However, the competing
American Football League (AFL) was not restricted from pooling broadcasting rights and entered into an agreement with ABC to pool its broadcasting rights and revenues.13 The NFL attempted to enter a similar
agreement with CBS in 1961, with Commissioner Pete Rozelle arguing
that the league’s competitive balance would be destroyed if teams continued to sell their broadcasting rights individually.14 After being enjoined
once again, the NFL successfully lobbied Congress into passing the SBA,
which insulated league-wide pooling agreements for sponsored telecasting from antitrust challenges and established parity between the NFL and
AFL.15 The next three decades saw significant improvements in broadcasting technology, prompting professional sports leagues to explore new
methods of broadcasting and setting the stage for the NFL-DirecTV
Agreement in 1994.16
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Ninth Circuit case in question—National Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litigation v. DirecTV, LLC—was initiated when four
plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint against the NFL, each NFL team,
and DirecTV on behalf of a putative class of NFL Sunday Ticket subscribers.17 The complaint alleged that the defendants’ interlocking agreements violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by suppressing competition
for the sale of professional football telecasts.18 Specifically, the complaint
alleged that in the absence of the Teams-NFL and NFL-DirecTV Agreements, individual teams would compete for the distribution of their telecasts, thereby increasing output and decreasing the price of telecasts.19
The Central District of California dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim under either § 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act.20
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Significantly, the SBA’s antitrust exemption does not apply to collegiate sports telecasts. As a result, when a group of college football programs tried to enter a pooled broadcasting agreement similar to the
NFL’s, they were held liable for a contract in restraint of trade under § 1
of the Sherman Act.21 The Supreme Court determined that the agree12. H.R. REP. NO. 93-483, at 2034 (1973).
13. Id.
14. U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1346 (2d Cir. 1988).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1961); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-483, at 2036.
16. See Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig. v. DirecTV, LLC, 933
F.3d 1136, 1147 (9th Cir. 2019).
17. Id. at 1148.
18. Id. at 1149.
19. Id.
20. See In re Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., No. ML 15-02668BRO, 2017 WL 3084276, at *21 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2017).
21. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (NCAA),
468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984).
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ment constituted a horizontal restraint that limited competition for
broadcasting rights between the universities, which would decrease the
number of telecasts and increase the price of broadcasting rights for college football games.22 Similarly, the NFL has been held liable under § 1
for horizontal agreements to pool teams’ property rights in other markets
where the NFL is not afforded the protection of the SBA.23 For example,
an agreement between the NFL and the teams to form a separate entity
that jointly licensed each team’s intellectual property constituted concerted action in violation of § 1.24 Even though the agreement formed a
single entity, the Supreme Court held that because the teams had separate business interests as competitors, collectively licensing their intellectual property deprived the marketplace of independent decision-making
and, thus, competition.25
While proving harm to competition is relatively easy in cases of horizontal restraints, proving injury from the harm to competition can be
more difficult. In order to have standing, plaintiffs must allege that their
harm was caused directly by the antitrust violator.26 This is further complicated in cases of multi-level agreements like the NFL-DirecTV Agreement, where the NFL “manufactures” the product that is distributed to
consumers by DirecTV. Under Illinois Brick, indirect purchasers who are
two or more steps removed from the alleged violator in a distribution
chain do not have standing to bring antitrust claims.27 As always, there is
an exception: when co-conspirators jointly commit an antitrust violation,
a plaintiff who is the immediate purchaser from any of the conspirators is
directly injured by the antitrust violation.28
A. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE’S SUNDAY TICKET ANTITRUST
LITIGATION V. DIRECTV, LLC
On appeal, the defendants argued that the § 1 complaint both failed to
allege harm to competition and failed to establish antitrust standing.29
Because the defendants did not argue that the SBA applied to satellite
broadcasting, the court assumed it did not apply and NCAA controlled
the analysis.30 The complaint alleged that the NFL’s interlocking agreements imposed similar restraints on competition to those found in
NCAA: output restrictions on teams’ telecasts, a horizontal agreement
among competitors, and a restriction on the number of telecasts available
to broadcasters and consumers.31 The complaint’s similarity to NCAA
22. See id. at 106.
23. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 202–03 (2010).
24. See id. at 197.
25. Id.
26. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
27. See id. at 730.
28. See In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 750 (9th Cir. 2012).
29. Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig. v. DirecTV, LLC, 933 F.3d
1136, 1150 (9th Cir. 2019).
30. Id. at 1151.
31. Id.
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convinced the majority, which rejected a number of the defendants’ arguments in turn.32 The most interesting argument raised was that the telecasts required joint action, making the restrictions procompetitive.33
Here, the defendants tried to distinguish American Needle, arguing that
the telecasts “could only be created through cooperation between competitors,”34 while American Needle “concerned separately owned intellectual property.”35 The court responded that the telecasts contained each
team’s intellectual property and that teams would be able to coordinate
their own telecasts in the absence of such an agreement—the exact result
Commissioner Rozelle wanted to avoid.36 Additionally, the court compared the NFL’s arrangements to those of the other major professional
sports leagues, where some, but not all, telecast rights are pooled for
distribution.37
The next major issue was whether the plaintiffs had adequately alleged
antitrust standing.38 Naturally, the defendants pointed to Illinois Brick,
but the majority applied the co-conspirator exception from In re ATM
Fee Antitrust Litigation.39 Because the complaint alleged the plaintiffs’
resulting injury was caused by a conspiracy between DirecTV, the NFL,
and the NFL teams to limit output, the complaint adequately alleged a
cause of action under § 1.40 The co-conspirator exception in ATM Fee
was limited “to cases where an indirect purchaser ‘establishes a pricefixing conspiracy between the manufacturer and the [distributor]’”;41 yet,
the majority seemed unfazed in applying the exception here, even though
the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged output restrictions, not a price-fixing conspiracy.42 It was on this ground that Judge N. Randy Smith (who authored the ATM Fee opinion) dissented, arguing that the plaintiffs’
challenge was clearly based on a “pass-on” theory of injury through the
distributor, exactly what the Illinois Brick rule was designed to prevent.43
According to Smith, the co-conspirator exception applies only “when the
co-conspirators fix the price paid by the plaintiff,” which the plaintiffs did
not allege.44 Finally, the court quickly determined the plaintiffs had alleged a cause of action under § 2, which hinged on similar issues.45
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
2012)).
45.

See id.
Id. at 1153.
Id.
Id. (citing Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 187 (2010)).
Id. at 1154.
Id.
Id. at 1156.
Id.
Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1157 (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 749 (1977)).
See id. at 1158.
Id. at 1160 (Smith, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 1162 (quoting In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 752 (9th Cir.
Id. at 1159 (majority opinion).
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IV. ANALYSIS
Thus far, NFL’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litigation only opens the door
to an antitrust challenge, allowing the plaintiffs to survive the pleadings
stage. The court was correct to apply NCAA, given that the SBA applies
only to sponsored telecasts. However, the court seems somewhat uninformed about the Sunday Ticket package—and the NFL’s broadcasting
arrangements in general—which warrants consideration of whether the
SBA should apply to subscription-based telecasts, rather than continually
subjecting such agreements to antitrust challenges.46
As the Ninth Circuit mentioned, the alternative arrangement to the
Sunday Ticket package would be for teams to compete with each other in
the market for broadcasting rights, like they did in the 1950s.47 This has
the potential to significantly impair the NFL’s signature competitive parity. In the absence of the Sunday Ticket package, the less successful
small-market teams would be unable to compete with the major-market
teams for the sale of telecast rights nationwide. While the league’s salary
cap is designed to protect on-field parity, financially disadvantaged teams
are still less likely to be competitive on the field.48 The NFL’s primary
method of promoting economic parity is through revenue sharing; the
league distributes about 60% of its revenue equally among the teams,
with much of the revenue generated from television deals.49 The DirecTV
deal alone accounts for $1.5 billion in annual revenue, making up a sizable portion of each team’s share.50 Ensuring that teams share most of
their revenue—rather than compete for it—allows the NFL to better
achieve competitive balance, which attracts both fan interest and dollars
to the league.51
The majority also seems to ignore the NFL’s role in producing telecasts. In holding that the telecasts were the separately owned intellectual
property of each team, Judge Sandra S. Ikuta cited the rule that “the
party who actually creates the work, . . . [who] translates an idea into a
fixed, tangible expression” owns the copyright.52 How this excludes the
NFL itself is perplexing when the NFL promotes, schedules, and officiates each and every game—not to mention its role in producing the telecasts. The court’s comparison of the NFL’s broadcasting arrangements to
46. See id. at 1147. Subscription-based telecasts include cable or satellite television
contracts for which subscribers are charged a fee. See id.
47. Id. at 1149.
48. See Michael Ozanian et al., The NFL’s Most Valuable Teams 2019: Cowboys Lead
League at $5.5 Billion, FORBES (Sept. 4, 2019, 7:25 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
mikeozanian/2019/09/04/the-nfls-most-valuable-teams-2019-cowboys-lead-league-at-55-billion/#239701382f1b [https://perma.cc/FB3A-FKK2].
49. See Howard Bloom, NFL Revenue-Sharing Model Good for Business, SPORTING
NEWS (Sept. 5, 2014), https://sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/nfl-revenue-sharing-televisioncontracts-2014-season-business-model-nba-nhl-mlb-comparison-salary-cap/gu0xok7mphu
01x3vu875oeaq6 [https://perma.cc/4Z3W-8N4V].
50. See Rovell, supra note 1.
51. Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports
Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 752 (2010).
52. NFL’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 933 F.3d at 1154.
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those of Major League Baseball (MLB) and the National Hockey League
(NHL) is also unconvincing.53 The MLB and the NHL both allow teams
to compete in the market for telecasts largely out of necessity; the
leagues’ longer seasons and less uniform schedules would make exclusive
pooling arrangements impractical. The Sunday Ticket package, on the
other hand, offers procompetitive efficiencies both to NFL teams and
consumers.
While the Ninth Circuit was content to characterize the Sunday Ticket
package as a restriction on output of telecasts, a better label would be a
consumer choice restriction. The broadcast networks still televise each
game, but only a few are nationally televised and available without a Sunday Ticket subscription. Because teams are allowed to restrict other
teams’ telecasts within their geographic territory under the SBA, competition between teams for out-of-market telecasts would not necessarily
increase the number of telecasts available nationally. While the Supreme
Court in NCAA found that the output of telecasts would increase absent
the agreement,54 this is mainly attributable to the fact that National Collegiate Athletic Association teams are prohibited from restricting other
teams’ telecasts, unlike the NFL.
The Sunday Ticket package is comparable to a blanket license for musical copyrights challenged in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., in which the Supreme Court held that the sellers of
these blanket licenses were not in violation of the Sherman Act.55 Although the blanket license involved a one-time purchase for the license of
each composer’s music, this did not constitute price fixing because the
blanket license was more like an entirely new product that the composers
themselves could not collectively sell, making it procompetitive.56 The
Sunday Ticket package could be seen as a blanket license to view every
NFL telecast by packaging every game into a single interface to make a
new product with lower transaction costs than the cost of purchasing individual telecasts. Further, the Sunday Ticket’s Red Zone channel, which
shows real-time highlights from every game, is also comparable because
the individual teams would be unable to collectively produce such a product. While the composers in Broadcast Music were not restricted from
individually marketing their copyrights like NFL teams are, it was commercially impracticable to do so, putting them in essentially the same
category.57
V. CONCLUSION
Although there are some facially anticompetitive aspects to the NFL
and DirecTV’s Sunday Ticket package, there are also compelling reasons
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See id.
See NCAA, 468 U.S. 85, 94 (1984).
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979).
Id. at 22.
See id. at 20.
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for protecting it from antitrust liability. The Sunday Ticket package is a
unique product that both decreases transaction costs and helps maintain
competitive parity within the NFL. The proposed alternative arrangement shows little promise in promoting competition within the telecast
market and poses a danger to the league’s weaker teams. While the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis was mostly correct from a legal standpoint, it was
slightly misguided in other areas, suggesting that congressional intervention may be a viable option.

